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This paper explores some of the key challenges and opportunities in the implementation of the broad-based black 
economic empowerment (BBBEE) deal of Kumba Resources, which subsequently led to the formation of Exxaro 
Limited, a large black-owned mining conglomerate in South Africa.  Qualitative data were collected through in-depth 
interviews with a sample of 11 leaders involved directly in the deal.  The data were content-analysed and the findings 
suggested that BEE transactions faced numerous challenges, including finding sustainable funding, securing suitable 
investors, merging various cultures, dealing with fronting and leadership, and planning management and leadership 
succession. The study concluded that the deal led successfully to both the equitable transfer of ownership and 
management and to the control of financial and economic resources to a wider base of the black population. However, 
several malpractices were identified which may have impeded the process of achieving the intended outcomes. The 
article provides recommendations, indicates limitations and proposes a way forward. 
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Introduction 
 
The government of South Africa (SA) implemented broad-
based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) as a nation-
building strategy. The act intends to empower ‘all blacks’ 
listed as Africans, Coloureds and Indians.  The strategy is 
based on the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act No. 53 of 2003 in conjunction with its Associated 
Charters, the Codes of Good Practice and various 
Scorecards. Initially South African companies used the 
narrow-based black economic empowerment (BEE) criteria 
or the draft phase 1 of the Codes, and, as a result of non-
alignment of the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act, several private and government 
organisations still use the narrow-based approach. However, 
the implementation of the broad-based economic 
empowerment (BBBEE) of the Codes has introduced new 
ways of defining and measuring BEE, which has led to 
contemplation in the companies comparative BEE rankings 
(Grobler, 2006). Grobler (2006) suggests that in comparison 
to their narrow-based versions, the broad-based Codes and 
the Sector Charters not only encourage and formalise broad-
based empowerment, but they also place more emphasis on 
the inclusion and participation of women and new sector 
players, besides accentuating broad-based structures and 
financial sustainability. Hence, contrary to some claims 
about the ‘failure of BEE’ (Slaughter, 1999; Sono, 1999; 
Turok, 2000), a multiracial middle class, including a black 
capitalist class, has begun to emerge over the last decade in 
South Africa (Iheduru, 2004). The emergence of the black 
bourgeoisie may indeed be occurring at much faster rate; 
however what is not clear is the likelihood of this class 
being able to push for the enactment and successful 
implementation of the BEE strategies (Iheduru, 2004). 
 
Simultaneously, BEE dealings which meet the demanding 
expectations of government and society within the realities 
of business are not easy. They are relatively low in success 
rate, signifying a paradox between the accuracy about such 
transactions and the government policy. Besides, a BEE deal 
can create instability and lead to a great deal of turbulence in 
the business sector. One of the reasons for this is that certain 
BEE parties acquire shares in various companies, while 
others move into short-term business opportunities (Turok, 
2006). Secondly, access to the large amounts of capital 
required for such deals is sometimes a major concern as 
most of these transactions take place in the open market 
without government’s involvement, not even in the selection 
of partners (Fauconnier, 2006). Although, anecdotal 
evidence suggests some common problems that could 
contribute to the failure of many such deals (Fauconnier, 
2006), no empirical study could be found to validate these 
claims and conclude exact reasons. 
 
The present study is exploratory in nature and aims to 
contribute to the literature by attempting to address the gap 
in BEE dealings, the challenges and the factors for the 
achievement of success – which are currently unavailable in 
the literature. The aim is to explore the contexts of theory 
and practice of BEE transactions by examining the case of 
the resultant company Exxaro Limited to investigate the 
following: challenges faced by all parties during the BBBEE 
transaction; positive aspects of the transaction; current and 
future challenges for Exxaro Limited; and plans to address 
them to ensure sustainability and the successful completion 
of the deal. 
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Aim of the study 
 
The present study aims to explore the unique experience of 
the leaders and decision-makers in the Kumba Resources 
BEE transaction and the formation of Exxaro Limited, and 
examines the challenges faced, and success factors 
experienced during and after the deal.  
 
Black Economic Empowerment 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), or the narrow-based 
approach, came into existence in 1994, when South Africa 
elected its first democratic government. This was followed 
by the establishment of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) Commission in 1999 and the 
subsequent strategies and policies to increase black 
ownership of businesses and to accelerate black 
representation in management (Booysen, 2007). While in 
1990 black people occupied 3% of the corporate 
management positions (Gray & Karp, 1993), in 1995 they 
owned only 1% of the total market value of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Cargill, 1999).   
 
Although BEE is not affirmative action as such, 
employment equity forms part of it (Republic of South 
Africa, 2007a). BEE was introduced not only to redress the 
imbalances of the past, but also to implement a growth 
strategy aimed at realising the country’s full economic 
potential, increasing the skills levels, creating more jobs, 
and reducing poverty in a short period of time without 
redistribution of existing wealth (Republic of South Africa, 
2007b). Iheduru (2004) hence argues that strategically the 
black bourgeoisie integration would also foster the creation 
of a successful capitalist economy in South Africa.  
 
The broad-based or the second phase of BEE was introduced 
because the narrow-based or the first-phase approach was 
found to limit the set objectives. For instance, in 2003, 60% 
of the empowerment deals amounting to R25.3 billion went 
to the companies of only two black businessmen 
(Kovacevic, 2007). Kovacevic (2007) argued that although 
BEE professes to promote the meaningful participation of 
black people in the economy, it actually fosters a political 
cronyism that benefits only a few elites. Moreover, the BEE 
initiative, although an empowerment incentive, is an 
inadequate means of extending prosperity (Kovacevic, 
2007), while further widening the income disparity within 
the black population.  
 
Similarly, Du Toit, Krugar and Ponte (2008), in their study 
on BEE in South Africa’s wine industry, indicate that while 
BEE has potentially provided a whole new spectrum of 
possibilities to established industries, the system of 
monitoring and verification proposed by government and the 
industry charters is technocratic and favours individuals 
rather than workers collectively or their communities. 
Although this might have been the case with the narrow-
based (BEE) approach, it could have been avoided by the 
use of broad-based BEE.  
 
For the meaningful and sustainable implementation of 
BBBEE and its measurement across all sectors of the 
economy, the Department of Trade and Industry 
implemented the Codes of Good Practice in 2007, providing 
guidelines as a standard framework to ensure that no 
industry is disadvantaged in relation to another when 
presenting its broad-based credentials, and that all 
businesses and industries work towards a long-term plan for 
economic transformation that is measurable and realistic for 
all stakeholders (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004). 
Therefore companies employing BBBEE are committed to 
finding common ground between their own specific industry 
charters and the Department of Trade and Industries (DTI) 
Codes.  
 
Various BEE deals that have taken place over the past 
decade, 1996 to 2006, have their value shown in Figure 3 
below. 
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Figure 1: Value of disclosed BEE deals, 1996 – 2006 
Source: Business Map Foundation, 2007. 
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The Business Map Foundation (2006) recorded 350 BEE 
deals in 2005, compared to some 250 deals in 2004. In 2004 
there were several very large deals, whereas in 2005 there 
were more deals with a lower average rand value (Business 
Map Foundation, 2006). Figure 1 shows an apparent 
reduction in BEE deals in value only, hence although the 
R55 billion in 2005 is a significant figure, it does not 
indicate the BEE activities in full scale. Furthermore, in a 
number of transactions the value of stakes bought by black 
investors was not disclosed (Business Map Foundation, 
2006). For example, in 2006 approximately 317 BEE deals 
were announced with only about 173 of them disclosing the 
value of their transaction (Business Map Foundation, 2007). 
These 173 deals represent approximately R75 billion, which 
is a notable increase from 2005.  
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Figure 2: BEE deal activity by sector for 2003 – 2006 
Source: Business Map Foundation, 2007. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the Resources sector has been on the 
forefront of BEE deals since the Broad-Based Socio-
Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African 
Mining Industry was introduced in 2003. The financial, 
resources and industrial sectors generally tend to disclose 
their values, as a large number of these companies are listed 
and operate under strict corporate governance procedures 
(Business Map Foundation, 2007). 
 
The Generic Scorecard and its seven elements 
 
The BBBEE expectations from the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s (2004) perspective and scorecard recognition is 
determined by the contribution of businesses to broad-based 
BEE and the business leaders buying into the national 
agenda, across the seven elements of: ownership, 
management, employment equity, skills development, 
procurement, enterprise development and socio-economic 
development (Balshaw & Goldberg, 2005). These seven 
elements combine on a weighted scale, which is known as 
the Generic Scorecard. This Generic Scorecard is a tool used 
to systematically quantify the extent to which a company is 
BBBEE compliant. 
 
 
Figure 3: Seven elements of the Generic Scorecard 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2004. 
 
BBBEE applies to all enterprises that conduct a business, 
trade or profession in South Africa, whether they are 
companies, sole proprietors, cooperatives, multinationals, 
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enterprises owned by state organisations or public entities. 
Moreover, the codes requirements apply equally to white- 
and black-owned and controlled enterprises. 
 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry (2004), 
Section 12 of the BBBEE Act has made provision for 
sectors to develop their own industry-specific 
transformation charters. The charter enables specific sectors 
to build sector-wide commitment to BBBEE, including 
undertakings by both government and the private sectors to 
implement measures to fast-track BBBEE. 
 
South Africa’s key empowerment charters  
 
The development of industry-specific black economic 
empowerment (BEE) charters in South Africa is an 
empowerment framework for the country's specific 
industries, including the mining industry, petroleum and 
liquid fuels industry, the maritime, tourism and financial 
services, the ICT industry, and the construction sector. Each 
charter is tailored to suit a particular industry and generally 
stipulates a target of 25% black ownership over the next 10 
years (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004).  In the 
current empowerment legislation, the mining industry and 
the petroleum and fuel industry charters are placed to 
provide a framework for a systematic and continuous 
empowerment of the historically disadvantaged South 
Africans in these industries.  
 
Mining industry charter 
  
 
 
Figure 4: Eight elements of the Mining Industry Charter  
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2002. 
 
 
Figure 4  shows criteria of the charter, namely Ownership, 
Joint ventures and control of enterprises and assets; Human 
resource development; Employment equity; Non-
discrimination against migrant labour; Development of rural 
and mine community; Housing and living conditions; 
Procurement;  Skills development (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2004; Republic of South Africa, 2002).  
 
In 2002, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) 
introduced the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment 
Charter for South Africa’s Mining Industry, with the aim to: 
• promote equitable access to the nation's mineral 
resources to all the people of South Africa;  
 
• substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities 
for historically disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA), 
including women, to enter the mining and minerals 
industry and to benefit from the exploitation of the 
nation's mineral resources;  
 
• utilise the existing skills base for the empowerment of 
the historically disadvantaged South Africans; 
 
• expand the skills base of HDSA in order to serve the 
community;  
 
• promote employment and advance the social and 
economic welfare of mining communities and the 
major labour distribution  areas; and  
 
• promote beneficiation of South Africa's mineral 
commodities (Republic of South Africa, 2002).  
 
The objective of the Mining Industry Charter was to achieve 
26% ownership of the previously disadvantaged people in 
the mining companies by 2012. The charter provides a 
framework to help the mining companies to comply with the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, which 
obliges them to promote black economic empowerment 
when applying for the new mineral rights or converting 
current rights. A key component of the charter is the mining 
scorecard, which sets out standards for measuring the 
BBBEE process in the sector. The charter has similarities 
with, and is based on, the generic scorecard as proposed in 
the Codes of Good Practice issued by the department of 
trade and industry (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2004). Although it needs to be aligned to the generic 
scorecard as a way forward, this is as yet not aligned with 
the codes and is not the same, despite similarities.  
 
The scorecard is the main tool for setting transformation 
standards against which individual enterprises are measured. 
The charter commits government, industry and labour, to 
planning mechanisms to enable businesses to achieve their 
BBBEE targets, and to set out sector specific scorecards. 
These undertakings are listed in the Mining Industry Charter 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2004).  
 
BEE transaction of Kumba Resources and the 
forming of Exxaro Limited 
 
The formation of Exxaro Limited is an example of a 
BBBEE transaction of a mining industry which became one 
of the largest black-owned, black-controlled and black-
managed companies in South Africa, with a market 
capitalisation of R16 billion when it was formed in 
November 2006 and first listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) (Republic of South Africa, 2007b). 
However this transaction faced several challenges.  
 
Kumba Resources Limited, one of South Africa’s largest 
diversified mining companies with a market capitalisation of 
R34.6 billion (Kumba Resources, 2006), was spun-off from 
Iscor in 2001 and had interests in iron ore, coal, heavy 
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minerals and zinc (Kumba Resources, 2006). In 2003, Anglo 
American plc acquired more than 35% of Kumba Resources 
shares and was forced to make a mandatory offer for the 
remaining shares in Kumba Resources. Although Anglo 
American plc gave a verbal undertaking to the South 
African government to maintain its shareholding below 
49%, the rand strengthened during the offer period leading 
to more shareholders than expected accepting the Anglo 
American plc mandatory offer (Kumba Resources, 2006). 
This resulted in Anglo American plc owning 66% of Kumba 
Resources shares and becoming the major shareholder of the 
company. Subsequently, it lead to conflict of interests as 
Kumba Resources and Anglo American plc had overlapping 
interests in coal, zinc and heavy minerals (Kumba 
Resources, 2006).  
 
While Kumba Resources was committed to finding common 
ground between the mining industry’s charter and the DTI’s 
codes, its strategy was to become truly representative of 
South Africa’s demographics, and to build a credible 
empowerment base and position itself as a constructive role- 
player in the transformation and development of the South 
African mining industry. Hence it embraced the BBBEE 
strategy.  
 
In October 2005, Kumba Resources, Anglo American plc 
and Eyesizwe Mining announced the ingress of Kumba 
Resources into a Transaction Framework Agreement, 
through which the relevant parties embarked on a series of 
transactions that resulted in the unbundling and separate 
listing of Kumba Iron Ore and the transfer of a controlling 
interest in Kumba Resources to Exxaro, a black-owned and 
black-controlled company, by means of a fully funded and 
sustainable transaction (Kumba Resources, 2006). 
 
  
 
* Listed on the JSE
Minorities Anglo American* IDC
Kumba Resources*
Iron Ore Coal Mineral Sands Base Metals and Industrial Minerals
Sishen Iron Ore 
(SIOC)
21.7% 64.9% 13.4%
100%
 
Figure 5: Kumba Resources structure before the unbundling in 2006 
Source: Kumba Resources, 2006. 
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* Listed on the JSE
SPV: Special Purpose Vehicle
EEPS: Employee Empowerment Participation Scheme
IDC Eyesizwe SPV Eyabanthu SPV Tiso SPV
BEE Women's 
SPVMinorities
Kumba Iron Ore
SIOC
SIOC ESPS
SIOC 
Community 
Development 
Trust
Anglo American* BEE Holdco Exxaro EEPS
Exxaro*
Iron Ore Coal Mineral Sands Base Metals and Industrial Minerals
15% 55% 9.5% 9.5% 11%
19%
53%
13.4%
64.9%
21.7%
74%
3%
3%
20%
85%
25%
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Figure 6: Exxaro Limited structure, after the unbundling of Kumba Resources 
Source: Kumba Resources, 2006. While Figure 5 illustrates the structure of Kumba Resources before its unbundling in 2006, Figure 6 
illustrates the structure of Exxaro Limited, a company formed as a consequence of the unbundling. The BEE partners involved in Exxaro 
Limited were Eyesizwe SPV, Eyabanthu Consortium, Tiso Consortium, BEE Women’s Group and Sishen Iron Ore Company (SIOC) 
Community Development Trust. Figure 6 shows that they are the prime shareholders of the newly formed company. 
 
Methodology 
 
Sample 
 
The study aimed to investigate and establish challenges 
faced during the BEE transaction of Exxaro Limited, as well 
as how these challenges were addressed. Therefore the 
sample was carefully selected – after the detailed 
examination of individuals from a group of senior 
representatives who were directly involved in the Exxaro 
Limited transaction – to share their experiences, rather than 
to represent a large group.  
 
The sample consisted of 11 individuals representing 23% of 
the population of the total number of representatives from 
Anglo American South Africa, the former Kumba 
Resources, Eyesizwe Mining, Tiso Consortium, Eyabanthu 
Consortium, South Africa Women in Mining Association 
(SAWIMA), Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), 
Chamber of Mines, Deutsche Bank, Rand Merchant Bank 
(RMB) and government, more specifically the Department 
of Minerals and Energy (DME).  
 
Data collection method 
 
Data were obtained through the semi-structured, open-ended 
and in-depth interview method as the purpose was to cover 
certain themes. This method allows freedom to further 
explore themes and questions emerging from the interviews 
and to give the interviewee an opportunity to offer 
information outside the initial themes and questions posed. 
 
Interviews 
 
Interviewees were personally contacted by one of the 
authors and were invited to volunteer to participate in the 
research. The objectives of the study were explained and 
interviewees were assured that the data would be treated 
with confidentiality. All interviewees who were approached 
agreed to participate. The aim was to obtain in-depth 
information through semi-structured interviews, and the 
sample was at liberty to convey any information other than 
that requested. The interviews were conducted at a time and 
place suitable to the interviewees and lasted approximately 
one hour to one and a half hours.  
 
Analysis strategy  
 
The method of content analysis was used to analyse the 
qualitative data obtained. This method enables the 
occurrence of specific terms or concepts in a text or set texts 
to be determined and for the meaning of such content in a 
given context to be inferred. The method also allows open-
ended questions to be coded, through disclosing differences 
in communication, determining the psychological state of 
sample groups and identifying reflections of cultural 
patterns within individuals, groups and societies (Weber, 
1990). The content analysis method was a practical and 
descriptive tool to investigate the experiences of the given 
sample group. The qualitative data obtained were used only 
in the descriptive sense to explore the problems and 
challenges faced during BEE transactions by the senior 
representatives, and not for testing any specific hypotheses 
or statistical inferences.  
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Categories for content analysis  
 
The interview questions were classified under the following 
seven categories for content analysis: 
 
Category A: Main challenges encountered during the 
transaction. The questions for this category were designed 
to investigate the major problems and challenges 
encountered by all parties during the transaction.  
 
Category B: Processes and methods used to overcome the 
main challenges. Questions for this category were designed 
to investigate the processes and methods used by the various 
parties to overcome the challenges and problems faced 
during the transaction. 
 
Category C: Sustainability issues. The design of the 
questions for this category focused on the exploration of 
sustainability issues of a transaction of this magnitude. 
 
Category D: Positive aspects. Questions for this category 
were designed to explore the positive aspects and the things 
that went well during the transaction. 
 
Category E: Current issues. For this category the questions 
were formulated to investigate the challenges currently 
faced by Exxaro Limited, after conclusion of the deal. 
 
Category F: Future challenges. Focus of the questions for 
this category was on investigating potential challenges for 
the newly formed company and the link to sustainability.  
 
Category G: Different options. The questions in this 
category were designed to investigate alternatives to what 
was done during the transaction and the way that challenges 
were addressed.   
 
Results 
 
Category A: Main challenges encountered. For nine 
respondents, the main challenge was the establishment of an 
innovative and sustainable funding structure, devised to 
ensure minimal leakage of value for the shareholders of 
Kumba Resources and to create wealth for the BEE groups, 
subsequently becoming shareholders in the new company. 
Four respondents reported aligning the interests of the 
various parties involved in the transaction as another 
challenge.   
 
For the majority the challenge was to ensure that all 
stakeholders were involved in every step of the transaction, 
considering the complexity and size of the deal. For one 
person, determining a base of aligned shareholders who 
were realistic in their expectations about the risks involved 
and understanding each party’s contribution to the success 
of the deal was a huge challenge.   
 
For four respondents, ensuring that the empowerment was a 
broad-based one was a challenge which they had to deal 
with from the inception of the transaction. For another four 
individuals, conflicting issues within certain BEE groups 
needed to be dealt with. According to one individual the 
challenge was that some of the BEE groups were divided 
entities with non-aligned interests when they entered into 
the transaction.  
  
Two individuals stated that finding the right BEE partners 
and the right combination of partners was a challenge. For 
one respondent the lock-in period for the BEE partners was 
a challenge that had to be addressed within the various BEE 
groups.  
 
The multinational company had developed plans based on 
its own agenda to obtain certain assets and BEE 
accreditation, which was being imposed onto the other 
transaction parties. Hence fitting into their agenda was a 
huge challenge, according to one respondent. 
  
One person reported that empowerment by definition 
requires wealth to be transferred from those who own it to 
people who historically did not have it or lacked the ability 
to generate it. Hence the problem was that certain BEE 
investors were only interested in generating wealth for 
themselves, and not in the sustainability of the new 
company. And hence establishing an innovative and 
sustainable funding structure was challenging.  
 
Two respondents stated that it was important that all the 
parties involved in the deal acknowledged government’s 
requirements and acted upon them. However, the challenge 
was in broadening the base of empowerment in South Africa 
and to avoid the “usual suspects” becoming the BEE 
partners through the transaction.  
 
Category B: Processes and methods used to overcome the 
main challenges. Four individuals reported that having a 
comprehensive and transparent process in place for the 
selection of BEE partners assisted in overcoming some of 
the challenges. 
 
Three individuals stated that having a good understanding of 
the needs and requirements of all the parties involved in the 
transaction and aligning their various interests, assisted in 
overcoming some of the challenges. One individual stated 
that since the beginning of the deal, there was clarity about 
various requirements, needs and expectations from various 
parties involved, which obviated spending a considerable 
amount of time on understanding and aligning the needs and 
expectations of all the parties. Four people stated that 
studying the background of various parties involved in the 
transaction, assisted in minimising some of the challenges. 
 
The establishment of a steering committee, regular strategic 
sessions, regular meetings and ongoing engagement were 
reported by four respondents as helping in overcoming some 
of the challenges.  
 
For one person, formation of various work streams within 
the steering committee and allocation of individuals within 
the project teams to work with the streams helped a lot. 
Using the right people with the right skills in concluding the 
deal was a favourable measure for three individuals.  
 
For over a quarter of the samples, setting up provisional 
funding was a good means of dealing with main problems, 
and, for two respondents, ensuring that the assets of the 
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various parties were of an acceptable standard and price, 
was an excellent means of managing certain challenges. 
 
One person reported that good, open, upfront and honest 
relationships and interaction between various parties and 
individuals helped greatly.  
 
Category C: Sustainability issues. Almost half of the total 
sample reported that establishing an innovative and 
competitive funding structure was an important approach to 
ensure sustainability of the transaction. According to one 
respondent, it was important to ensure a strong and sound 
asset base that could generate a certain cash flow, sustaining 
the deal, the company and the BEE shareholder funding.  
 
Four individuals reported that to ensure sustainability, it was 
important to create a diversified mining company with a 
sound asset base, good growth prospects and an attractive 
investment case. While, two respondents explained that it 
was important to bulk up the company to a size with a good 
mix of commodities that would be sustainable. Almost all 
respondents stated that, since diversity helps with the 
cyclical nature of the mining industry, it was important for 
Exxaro Limited. 
 
Over a quarter samples reported that finding the right BEE 
partners was important to ensure sustainability of the 
transaction. One individual reported that it was important to 
find and appoint a leading BEE partner with hands-on 
experience in managing mining assets and capabilities of 
leading the company, while ensuring that the partners could 
work together.  
 
A quarter of the sample found it important to identify 
quality leadership, management and succession planning as 
crucial for sustainability. According to one person, it was 
important to have representation of suitable quality at 
management and board levels, in order to instil confidence 
in people and in the markets, for investment purposes.   
 
Three people stated that a lengthy lock-in period for BEE 
partners was important for sustainability, as this would 
ensure that the company kept its broad-based empowerment 
status, while for one individual, benchmarking and stress-
testing against personal and institutionalised experiences 
helped in the sustainability of the organisation. 
 
Category D: Positive aspects. For more than a quarter of the 
sample the establishment of an innovative and creative 
funding structure, along with the associated facilitation and 
benchmarking exercise, went extremely well. Moreover, one 
respondent revelled that through clever financial 
engineering, the debt that needed to be serviced through 
dividend flow was reduced to acceptable levels. 
      
Although three respondents reported trust relationships as 
more beneficial between all the parties, for one respondent 
this was maintained throughout the transaction, especially 
with the consortium partners. 
 
Three individuals stated that the quality of assets and 
establishment of a critical mass in terms of the assets was 
favourable. One respondent stated that the value loss for 
shareholders of Kumba Resources was minimal and was 
adequately compensated for by the value creation after the 
listing of Exxaro Limited and Kumba Iron Ore in 2006.  
 
Three respondents reported that the selection and the 
combination of the BEE partners were done competently. 
One person stated that the efficiency of the structures and 
combination of the consortia were well put together.  
 
Two people stated that creating value for all transaction 
parties was a positive aspect. For two individuals the 
highlights were the women’s empowerment and community 
involvement. One person said that the transaction positively 
contributed towards the capacity-building goal of the 
country.  
 
Category E: Current issues. Of the total sample, five 
respondents mentioned that the company growth and value 
creation for all stakeholders were the main issues since the 
company’s listing.  One person explained that the challenge 
is in growing the company significantly with its vast 
opportunities, without diluting the empowerment 
shareholding below 51 percent for a certain period of time. 
 
According to five individuals, leadership, managing 
succession, transition and handing over (the period between 
current leadership and the leadership taking over) were the 
significant concerns. Furthermore they explained that it was 
difficult to bring people from different perspectives into an 
organisation as they have different outlooks on business and 
governance issues. 
 
Four respondents cited operational performance and stability 
as one of the current challenges that the new company had 
to deal with. They further stated that only through 
operational performance and stability could the company 
deliver on the asset base in a sustainable manner.  
 
One person stated that the new company was in the process 
of integrating various cultures and operations, but still had 
to perform to meet the production criteria. Three 
respondents stated that this creation of South Africa’s 
biggest black-owned and black-managed company had 
created expectations within the markets and the 
organisations; hence, dealing with them is a huge challenge. 
Two individuals reported that understanding the new 
business and giving coherence and meaning to it is a huge 
concern.  
 
Of the total sample, two individuals reported that 
maintaining a sound balance-sheet is currently a challenge 
for Exxaro Limited and will remain a future challenge. 
Another two respondents stated that issues within the BEE 
groups were challenging. For one person the issues that 
Exxaro Limited is currently facing mirror the social issues 
faced by South Africa, such as HIV/Aids, social upliftment 
of the communities, and the current skills shortage, locally 
and globally. 
 
Category F: Future challenges. Seven respondents reported 
that growing the company and realising the company’s good 
project pipeline will be a future challenge for Exxaro 
Limited. According to four respondents, performance and 
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efficiency are current and future challenges facing the new 
company. They state that it is necessary constantly to ensure 
business profitability through performance and efficiency in 
terms of costs. However for two people, keeping the 
company’s empowerment status is a huge future challenge.  
 
For over a quarter of the samples, the cyclical nature of the 
markets and the commodity prices were the future issue. 
According to one person, Exxaro Limited is dependent on 
commodity prices and the growth of the Chinese market, as 
a significant portion of Exxaro’s exports goes to China. 
Furthermore, the transaction was concluded in a bullish 
market. If there is a downturn in commodity prices and a 
bear market becomes apparent the share price could be 
depressed and the high level of gearing could become a 
problem. 
 
More than a quarter of the samples felt that skills attraction 
and retention is a current and foreseeable future challenge 
for Exxaro Limited. Two respondents perceived conversion 
of the mining rights as an issue that Exxaro Limited will 
have to grapple with, now and in the future. According to 
one respondent the inconsistencies within the DME 
(Department of Minerals and Energy) are problematic for 
Exxaro Limited, as they cause long delays in the conversion 
of mining rights, and associated input costs can be 
extremely high. Most of the mining charter content is vague 
and requires extensive interpretation. Every provincial 
department of the DME interprets the charter differently and 
mining organisations need to adapt to this – especially if the 
organisation does business in various provinces. This creates 
a lot of administrative uncertainties for mining companies. 
What is needed to convert mining rights in one province is 
not necessarily the same in another province. Furthermore, 
the DME at national level has its own interpretation of the 
charter which is not necessarily the same in the various 
provinces. Obviously this uncertainty can create delays in 
the conversion of mining rights and it also causes an 
increase in costs for mining companies. 
 
 For one individual, the dividend flow to the BEE partners 
was a concern. He further stated that the challenge will be to 
ensure that there is a consistent dividend flow to the 
shareholders, i.e. the BEE partners, every year without 
eroding the company’s margins.  
 
Category G: Different options. Five respondents said that 
they would have liked to spend more time on the due 
diligence of the BEE partners to be assured of the parties’ 
competence and to resolve issues within various BEE 
groups, as there were several deals and various interests and 
visions needed to be aligned. For four respondents more 
time should have been spent on a better understanding of 
mining legislative processes.  
 
Four respondents believed that only a few BEE partners 
should have been included in an empowerment transaction 
of this magnitude. One respondent acknowledged that the 
broadness of the partnership is a problem in itself as it 
became unwieldy to work with. For one respondent the 
communication should have been more proactive and the 
consortium of shareholders should have been briefed on an 
ongoing basis. Another respondent also stated that they 
should have been more proactive in the way they kept 
government abreast of the progress and decisions of the 
deal, without allowing its interference in the process. 
 
According to one individual, it was important that all the 
BEE partners had advisory capacity, although not every 
empowerment partner had access to top level advisors. In 
addition, the BEE partners did not have the best advice at all 
times and certain partners did not have advisory capacity. 
 
Discussions   
 
The findings are discussed in relation to the previous 
literature. 
 
Category A: Main challenges encountered. When 
compared, present findings in the case of Exxaro Limited 
correlate with the Gold Fields-Mvelaphanda transaction as 
both transactions required innovative funding structures to 
ensure the execution of the deals (Business Map Foundation, 
2003).  The similarities include the use of SPVs, mezzanine 
financing, issuing of preference shares, and vendor 
financing. A previous study (Goldwyer, 2007) found that the 
single most complex element of any empowerment 
transaction, for both principals and bankers, is related to 
financing. This is parallel to the results of the present study 
and is supported by the Gold Fields-Mvela Resources and 
De Beers-Ponahalo case studies (Business Map Foundation, 
2003).  
 
A previous study (Jack, 2006) claimed issues such as 
aligning the interests of various parties involved in the 
transaction as a huge challenge. Present results 
demonstrating the alignment of the interests of the various 
parties involved in the transaction as a huge challenge is 
consistent with the study of Jack (2006).  
 
A past study (Ryan, 2006) is consistent with the present 
results, demonstrating the samples’ awareness, 
understanding and their idea of implementing the 
government’s broad-based BEE in the Exxaro Limited case 
by notably leaving out the “usual suspects” and dealing with 
new black business as well as women’s groups. The study 
had claimed that in various major BEE deals, there was a 
determination to avoid the usual black suspects and to 
spread the benefits of the empowerment transactions 
broadly, and this consequently led to new black executive 
faces appearing in the country’s financial media.  
 
The present results and Kingston’s Report (Goldwyer, 2007) 
strongly correlate as they recognise various challenges 
posed by BEE, one of which pertains to finding the right 
partners and the right combination of partners, for a BEE 
deal. Kingston’s report further states that the equity 
weighting between the various groups depends on the details 
of the empowerment deal, as well as following a thorough, 
transparent tender process to select partners with objectives 
that merge with the company ethos. 
  
The present study found that the BEE partners have 
undertaken not to dispose of their shareholding until the fifth 
anniversary of the transaction completion date and to remain 
a historically disadvantaged South African (HDSA) group 
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until the final date. This is consistent with the findings of the 
previous study by Business Map Foundation (2003), stating 
that while the Gold Fields-Mvela Resources transaction had 
a similar lock-in period for its BEE partners,  Mvelaphanda 
undertook not to dispose of its empowerment interest in 
Gold Fields during the five-year lock-in period. The lock-in 
period was enforced to prevent dilution of the Gold Fields 
BEE status and to comply with the BEE Codes of Good 
Practice.  
 
The present study found that the challenge for BEE 
investors was to fit into the agenda of a multinational 
company.  This is congruent with Jack’s (2007) study, 
which found many negative compromises in BEE dealings 
that can kill the spirit of those involved in the deal. He also 
revealed a great amount of back-stabbing between BEE 
partners, which is perhaps reinforced by structuring a deal 
without full participation of BEE parties.   
 
Category B: Processes and methods used to overcome the 
main challenges. Present results and a past study (Creamer, 
2005) are consistent as they identify identical traits for 
selection of an appropriate and relevant partner for a BEE 
deal. In the deal mentioned in the present study, for 
example, a comprehensive and transparent BEE partner 
selection process was applied to avoid irrelevance of the 
deal and to identify value-adding partners showing an 
understanding of the industry, free of conflicts of interest, 
offering appropriate empowerment credentials, and with a 
good strategic fit to the company and characteristics 
complementary to the other parties involved in the 
transaction.   
 
The findings of the present study regarding the process and 
challenge of correctly evaluating assets are underlined by 
the reports of Radebe (2006), who stated that concluding a 
BEE deal requires creativity, innovation and out-of-the-box 
thinking. Moreover, Radebe suggests that it is crucial to 
evaluate correctly the assets that BEE partners are buying. 
An overpriced asset will be unattractive to prospective 
buyers, while underpriced assets will punish the seller.  
 
Category C: Sustainability issues. According to Albinski 
(2007), robustly structured cash flow-based BEE deals are 
sustainable and deliver value to all stakeholders. Since 
tested under various economic scenarios and built on 
appropriate margins of safety, they should ensure that a deal 
can handle all economic environments without unravelling. 
The present findings are consistent with Albinski (2007), as 
the deal leads to establishing an innovative and competitive 
funding structure based on realistic cash flows to ensure 
sustainability of the transaction and of Exxaro Limited.   
 
The deal in the present study strategically eliminated the 
politically connected usual candidates by considering them 
as unsuitable BEE partners for the Exxaro Limited 
transaction. This was to broaden the empowerment 
redistribution opportunities. Findings of the present study 
disagree with Reddy (Business Map Foundation, 2004), who 
had previously stated that empowerment, especially in the 
mining industry, was dominated by small, politically 
connected elites. This makes sense if the key value-add that 
the organisation is looking for is in the partner’s ability to 
access a mining licence. In this context highly politically 
connected partners would probably be the correct strategic 
choice. This further establishes the fact that while 
government remains the dominant provider of redistribution 
opportunities, it is likely that businesses will look at 
politically connected empowerment partners.  
 
Category D: Positive aspects. Balshaw and Goldberg (2005) 
observed that a broad-based BEE transformation process has 
an inherent ability to create distrust within a business that 
makes it difficult to operate effectively. This is because it 
stands or falls on the capacity of stakeholders to build trust 
and foster collaboration. Trust is promoted by addressing 
conflicts, having a shared vision, establishing suitable 
communication, decision-making and governance structures, 
sharing information and avoiding secretiveness by ensuring 
appropriate sanctions in circumstances where trust has been 
breached (Balshaw & Goldberg, 2005). Present findings are 
parallel with Balshaw and Goldberg’s (2005) report, stating 
that the new deals make tremendous efforts in building trust 
among various parties for sustainability of the transaction.  
 
According to Mashiatshidi (Business Map Foundation, 
2004), good BEE practice is not about entitlement or 
enrichment, neither is it a prescription for value 
appropriation without compensation. However, it is one that 
should not only avoid value destruction, but should be a 
platform for value creation. A strong correlation was found 
between the previous study of Mashiatshidi (Business Map 
Foundation, 2004) and present research. Both found creation 
of value for all parties involved in the transaction a 
significant aspect. In 2006 women investment groups and 
community involvement became more prominent in BBBEE 
transactions, although women did not always bring sector-
specific experience into a transaction. However they 
contributed to the broad-based nature of BEE. The present 
study reports that although it was a challenge to identify and 
incorporate women’s groups and community trusts as BEE 
investors, it was a significant outcome of the transaction.  
 
Category E: Current issues. According to Chiume and 
Kingston (2006), introduction of an empowerment 
shareholder is a complex process, not dissimilar to a typical 
merger and acquisition transaction. They further state that 
the process is made more complex by the need to meet the 
commercial objectives of the company, introducing the 
empowerment shareholders and also to mitigate the limited 
financing capacity of the typical black empowerment partner 
(Chiume & Kingston, 2006). Complex funding structures 
are often designed and implemented in order to address both 
the concerns of the company’s existing shareholders 
regarding potential value leakage and dilution, and the 
requirements of government and other key stakeholders 
tasked with advancing broader empowerment objectives 
(Chiume & Kingston, 2006). It is in developing a 
coordinated approach that the role of an investment banker 
in implementing BEE transactions becomes key (Chiume & 
Kingston, 2006). This coordinated approach addresses all of 
these elements while creating a transaction structure that is 
sustainable and that results in value creation for both the 
empowered company and its black empowerment partners. 
There are parallels between Chiume and Kingston’s (2006) 
report and the present study, both stating that growing the 
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newly formed company and creating value for all 
stakeholders necessary for sustainability was an issue.  
 
The findings of the present study indicate that the merging 
of cultures, operations and people is still a challenge for 
Exxaro Limited. However, doing this with success would 
contribute to the sustainability of the company. These 
findings are congruent with the findings of Malan and 
Foulds (Business Map Foundation, 2004), who suggest that 
the new South African organisations could be successful if 
an empowerment culture could be adopted, particularly one 
which emphasises the broad empowerment of its entire 
workforce. If, however, the organisation’s culture and a 
BEE culture do not fit then newly black-owned business is 
set for failure.  
 
The present study found that management succession and 
managing the transition and handover period, between the 
current leadership of the company and the leadership taking 
over in late 2007, are significant challenges facing Exxaro 
Limited. This correlates with the study of Radebe (2006), 
illustrating in the Johnnic / NEC case study the need for a 
lead BEE partner, leadership and management succession, 
as a challenge. Radebe (2006) notes that the original NEC, 
that acquired a controlling stake in Johnnic, had many 
participants but no clear leader. Although the empowerment 
deal failed owing to an inappropriate funding structure, but 
it also failed because of a lack of leadership (Radebe, 2006). 
In the absence of a lead BEE partner and leadership there 
was no coordination and there was nobody to take key 
investment decisions.  
 
Findings of the present study indicate that managing market 
expectations is a challenge for Exxaro Limited. This 
corresponds with the report of Reddy (Business Map 
Foundation, 2004), who indicates that the empowerment 
process is a market-driven process. Thus its progress and 
success will reflect all the machinations, risks and vagaries 
of the market and will depend upon the following: 
 
• A coherent regulatory environment 
 
• The coherent alignment of empowerment objectives 
with criteria used to allocate preferential opportunities 
 
• The strategic intent at an organisational level 
 
• Competitive dynamics at an industry level 
 
• An enabling business culture 
 
• Quality of funding. 
 
The present study indicates skills shortage as a challenge 
facing Exxaro Limited at present. It also indicates that a 
skills shortage dilemma is not confined to Exxaro Limited, 
but is a challenge facing the entire mining industry and the 
country. The study is found to be consistent with the reports 
of Hlengani (2006), who states that the failure of the 
education system to produce enough relevant skilled 
individuals, including plumbers, toolmakers and engineers, 
is one of the main reasons that the economic growth of the 
past few years in South Africa has not reduced 
unemployment levels.  
 
Category F: Future challenges. In the present study the 
Exxaro Limited transaction was concluded while the market 
was in a bullish phase with commodity prices at the top of 
their cycle; hence the cyclical nature of the market and the 
reason why commodity prices are a future challenge for the 
company. The findings of Davenport (2006) indicate that 
value creation and realisation will be difficult if BEE 
companies invest in organisations while commodity prices 
are at the top of the commodity cycle. Present findings are 
consistent with Davenport’s (2006) study. According to 
Davenport (2006), mining assets and company share prices 
are too expensive for small black investors. Hence it is not 
viable for BEE companies to buy into major conglomerates 
and their various assets, which are at the top of their 
commodity cycle, and make it much more difficult to realise 
value on these investments. BEE deals that have been 
successful and have remained economically viable up to this 
point are deals that were concluded when commodity prices 
were at the bottom of the down cycle (Davenport, 2006). 
 
According to Barends (Finweek, 2006), financing remains a 
problem for all empowerment players and has been thus 
since the inception of empowerment. Maphisa (Finweek, 
2006) points out that cash flow are related to the issue of 
financing. Empowerment deals tend to be structured over a 
relatively long period of time and in such a way that any 
dividends flowing from such investments go towards loan 
repayments (Finweek, 2006). This means that the BEE 
partner has no or limited cash flow to finance its operating 
costs. The findings of Barends (Finweek, 2006) and 
Maphisa (Finweek, (2006) reiterate the concerns expressed 
by the respondents of the present study, indicating 
apprehension regarding the dividend flow to the BEE 
partners. 
 
Category G: Different options. Cargill (2005) states that 
companies are tending to favour the approach of identifying 
a lead BEE investment company, which then becomes 
responsible for ensuring a broad base of shareholders 
involved, as a means to manage the alignment. However, the 
mainstream company tends to abdicate responsibility for 
ensuring a solid BEE investor grouping, yet will almost 
invariably carry all the reputational risk should things fall 
apart (Business Map Foundation, 2004). The present study 
found that aligning the interests of the various parties is a 
challenge, and therefore, to have a lead BEE investment 
company would have helped in the process, hence correlates 
with the reports of Cargill (2005).  
 
The present findings indicate that during the Exxaro Limited 
transaction, some uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the 
requirements of the Broad-Based BEE Act and the Mining 
Charter surfaced. This was owing to lack of time spent on 
attaining clarity and a better understanding of the legislation 
and the associated processes. This correlates with the study 
by Van der Merwe (Business Map Foundation, 2004) which 
states that while the enactment of the Empowerment Act is a 
positive step towards achieving a comprehensive legal 
framework for the transformation of the South African 
economy and the equitable distribution of its resources. Yet 
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it only puts in place various guidelines and objectives of 
what this transformation should achieve. It does not, 
however, set down detailed obligations as to the manner in 
which such transformation should take place (Business Map 
Foundation, 2004).  
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The challenges of broad-based black economic 
empowerment transactions are the same as those of mergers 
and acquisitions, wherein the new business model needs to 
work to produce a return for shareholders.  The drive behind 
a BEE transaction, however, comes from a legislative 
requirement, and even more so from the potential loss of 
business than some legal penalties.  The penalty in the 
BBBEE regulation is eventually loss of business. The 
problem in implementation of BBBEE is that ownership (the 
merger and acquisition element) only counts for 20% of the 
scorecard. 
  
Most engaged in mergers and acquisitions do not realise 
that, from a BBBEE perspective, there is another 80% on 
the scorecard that needs to be complied with.   
 
It is evident from the findings of the present study that some 
uncertainty and ambiguity exists around BEE legislation and 
its associated processes. The Act does not provide detailed 
prescriptions as to the manner in which companies should 
approach transformation. While the Mining Charter sets out 
clear objectives for mining organisations, the objectives of 
BEE legislation are ambiguous and open to varied 
interpretations. Therefore, mining organisations entering 
into BEE transactions will have to spend a significant 
amount of time understanding legislative requirements to 
ensure compliance. 
 
There is an increased focus on ensuring genuine and 
sustainable broad-based BEE in South Africa, essentially to 
implement suitable funding structures that are not superficial 
fronting arrangements. Many BEE transactions have failed 
since their inception owing to complex, elaborate and 
unsustainable funding structures (Fauconnier, 2006). These 
entail the use of hybrid funding instruments, debt finance, 
vendor finance and equity investment. The successfully 
implemented BEE transactions have similarities when 
scrutinising their funding structures that include the use of 
SPVS, mezzanine funding, issuing of preference shares, 
vendor financing, third-party funding, the use of dividend 
income to service the debt of the BEE investors, and 
sustainable cash flows.  
 
Present findings indicate that the funding structures based 
on share price appreciation and those that impose 
unreasonable conditions on BEE investors are unsustainable 
and invariably lead to the failure of the transaction. 
Benchmarking and stress-testing a funding structure and its 
cash flows under various economic scenarios, and 
incorporating appropriate margins of safety into the funding 
structure will ensure that the funding structure copes with 
various economic environments without unravelling.  
 
The present study avoided the use of the “usual suspects” in 
the transaction and emphasised the incorporation of broad-
based audiences. It nevertheless found difficulties in 
identifying and incorporating a broad-based audience with 
the necessary experience and expertise and in achieving 
alignment between the many interests of the broad-based 
audiences. Organisations are urged to follow a 
comprehensive and transparent BEE partner selection 
process to ensure good governance and to avoid undesirable 
repercussions.   
 
Although women are increasingly participating in the 
BBBEE transactions, there are very few women’s groups 
with sufficient experience and expertise to enable them to 
contribute substantially to these transactions.  
 
Organisations enforce lock-in periods for their BEE partners 
to prevent the dilution of the organisation’s BEE status. This 
is also in line with government’s objective of unencumbered 
ownership of enterprises by HDI on a sustainable basis. The 
challenge for the BEE investor lies in accepting the lock-in 
period and realising that liquidity will only be introduced 
once the lock-in period has expired.  
 
Interest in BBBEE is divergent. For certain organisations 
BBBEE is a compliance exercise rather than a strategic 
imperative. While for certain black people it is a quick way 
to get rich without consideration of the means they employ. 
The process of communicating and engaging facilitates the 
exploration of various options and assists in getting parties 
onto the same page. Moreover, it assists in gaining an 
understanding of the expectations, thoughts and perceptions 
of all the parties involved in such a transaction. It is clear 
that the success of a BBBEE deal hinges on the ability of 
stakeholders to build trust and foster collaboration. 
 
Given that the values of organisations centre on survival and 
best practices, the values of BEE leaders centre on 
community and social upliftment. Hence for BEE to be 
successful the challenge lies in bridging the gap between 
these sets of values and incorporating a comprehensive 
cultural transformation programme.  
 
The present study suggests that vendor companies and BEE 
partners should co-develop plans for the BEE transactions. 
Several vendor companies, especially multinationals, 
approach potential BEE investors with a predetermined 
agenda. And if the agenda of the vendor company does not 
favour the BEE investors, they offer the deal to BEE 
investors who are willing to accept their predetermined 
agenda, which may lead to back-stabbing among the BEE 
investors.  
 
Value creation is a vital part of a BEE transaction. This 
aspect should receive greater focus than those which may 
destroy values. Complex funding structures are often 
designed and implemented to minimise the leakage of value. 
However, for the existing shareholders involved in the 
transaction, there is always potential for value leakage. BEE 
must form part of the overall company strategy in order to 
realise growth prospects of the organisation and to create 
sustainable value.   
 
BBBEE deals can be concluded with success within a 
prevailing bull market where commodity prices are at the 
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top of their cycle. Creating a diversified mining company 
with a sound asset base and good growth prospects could 
assist in the sustainability of a BEE transaction. 
Empowerment is a market-driven process and its progress 
will reflect the intrigues, risks and vagaries of the market. 
There are no guarantees for the empowerment process. It is 
clear that BEE investors and empowerment companies will 
continually have to deal with market expectations. 
 
Limitation and future studies 
 
Since the present study is limited to the empowerment 
transactions of the Exxaro Limited case study, it may be 
useful for future studies to investigate comparable 
empowerment transactions within other mining industries in 
as much detail as the present investigation. It might also be 
useful to investigate and compare empowerment 
transactions across industries within the South African 
economy in similar detail to the present study.  
 
The proposed future studies could assist organisations with 
structuring and implementing BEE transactions more 
efficiently and cost-effectively. Future studies might also 
include investigations of BEE transactions as BEE evolves 
over time. An example of this is the evolution of financial 
structures during the first, second and current development 
of BEE. Each development of BEE brings new requirements 
for BEE participants as well as lessons learnt. Finally, it was 
difficult for the present study to create a sound theoretical 
base, owing to lack of empirical studies and literature in the 
field.  
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